What Is A Bitcoin Nonce [Simple]? - The Money Mongers

Let's try something different. I want to auction my domain [extranonce.com] for BTC. Any takers? /r/Bitcoin

Let's try something different. I want to auction my domain [extranonce.com] for BTC. Any takers? /Bitcoin submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

Satoshi ExtraNonce /r/Bitcoin

Satoshi ExtraNonce /Bitcoin submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

Did Satoshi make the nonce size too small?

Hi there
I'm been reading up trying to understand the ExtraNonce part of Bitcoin. It sounds like Satoshi made the space for nonces 32-bits long, but as difficult has kept increasing and now we've run out of space and have to store longer nonces as part of the CoinBase transaction (the 'extra nonce'). Is this correct?
So is the reality that Satoshi didn't foresee that nonces would get this large and it's an oversight that we've learned to live with in Bitcoin?
https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/32603/why-didnt-satoshi-make-the-nonce-space-larger?rq=1
https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/5048/what-is-the-extranonce
submitted by CadmeusCain to BitcoinBeginners [link] [comments]

Wrights latest fraudulent claims exposed by reverse engineering his redacted court filings

Wrights latest fraudulent claims exposed by reverse engineering his redacted court filings submitted by nullc to btc [link] [comments]

How do pools coordinate their miners so that no one wastes work?

Hello, I am trying to understand how a pool operator makes sure that miners do not check the same nonce and hence waste time and work.

In my head I have the following analogy: I have a bookshelf with 30 books. One of the books has a $10 bill (the reward). A friend and I are checking each book. If we just check the books at random, my friend could check a book I have already opened. So it would be best to coordinate: I start from the left end, he starts from the right end. And we save time.

Is there any such coordination by pool operators, or does every miner check nonces at random? Is there latency in communicating the coordination, or is it something that is set once and forever? If so, what happens when new miners join the pool or old one's leave the pool?

Thanks a lot in advance!
submitted by whatdoyounotknow2 to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Bitcoin Rhodium Mining Guide

Bitcoin Rhodium Mining Guide
Happy Mining!

All available XRC pools can be found on MiningPoolStats

Bitcoin Rhodium Mining Hardware

Baikal Giant+: 1.6 GH/s
Baikal Quad Cube: 1.2 GH/s
Baikal Giant: 900 MH/s
Baikal Quadruple Mini Miner: 600 MH/s
Baikal Miner Cube: 300 MH/s
Baikal Mini Miner: 150 MH/s

Mining Setup

To mine Bitcoin Rhodium you need to set up an XRC wallet and configure your miner of choice. You can choose between Web wallet, Electrum-XRC or Magnum wallet. To set up a web wallet please visit wallet.bitcoinrh.org. Or download and install Electrum-XRC wallet (recommended) for Windows, Linux and MacOS.
Web wallet: wallet.bitcoinrh.org
Electrum-XRC wallet: electrum.bitcoinrh.org
Magnum wallet: https://magnumwallet.co

Sign up for XRC web wallet if not yet done so

  1. Create an account, with your username, password and secure question.
  2. Sign in and click “Create Wallet”.
  3. Set up a strong transaction password. Make sure you store it securely in a secure password manager of choice.
  4. Copy the seed somewhere safe. It’d be a good idea to write seed on a hardcopy and keep it safe.
  5. Paste it to confirm you got it right.
  6. Grab an address for the mining step. Your wallet is now ready to mine XRC.

Instructions for mining XRC on the official pool

Pool link: poolcore.bitcoinrh.org
  1. Any miner that supports X13 will be able to mine XRC. We have a few examples below of miners that are well tested with Bitcoin Rhodium network.
  2. For any miner, configure the miner to point to:
(0–0.8 GH/s) stratum+tcp://poolcore.bitcoinrh.org:3061
(0.8–2 GH/s) stratum+tcp://poolcore.bitcoinrh.org:3062
(3–4 GH/s) stratum+tcp://poolcore.bitcoinrh.org:3063
(5+ GH/s) stratum+tcp://poolcore.bitcoinrh.org:3064
with your XRC address as username and x as password. You don’t need to open an account on pool. You will be mining to XRC address and mined coins will be transferred to your wallet
after blocks reach 10 block maturity
after you mined up minimal amount of coins (currently 0.1 XRC)
sometimes mined blocks could get rejected by network (orphaned) after they were counted as valid blocks. This is normal network behavior to follow longest chain
  1. http://poolcore.bitcoinrh.org is used to follow your miner and network statistics.

CPU Miner-Multi

Source: https://github.com/tpruvot/cpuminer-multi
Sample configuration with CPU Miner tested on UBUNTU.
{
“url” : “stratum+tcp://poolcore.bitcoinrh.org:3061”, “user” : “YOUR XRC ADDRESS”,
“pass” : “x”,
“algo” : “x13”, “threads” : 1,
“cpu-priority” : 5,
“cpu-affinity” : 1, “benchmark” : false, “debug” : true, “protocol”: true, “show-diff”: true, “quiet” : false
}
Command to run your CPUMiner: cpuminer -c cpuminer.json

SGMiner (ATI GPU)

SGMiner is a GPU-based mine: https://github.com/nicehash/sgminereleases
The configuration below was tested on Windows:
setx GPU_FORCE_64BIT_PTR 0
setx GPU_MAX_HEAP_SIZE 100
setx GPU_USE_SYNC_OBJECTS 1
setx GPU_MAX_ALLOC_PERCENT 100
setx GPU_SINGLE_ALLOC_PERCENT 100
cd C:\Software\sgminer-5.6.1-nicehash-51-windowsamd64 sgminer.exe
— gpu-platform 1 — algorithm x13mod -url stratum+tcp://poolcore.bitcoinrh. org:3062 — pool-user — userpass :x — auto-fan — temp-target 70 — temp-over- heat 82 — temp-cutoff 85 — gpu-fan 65–85 — log-file log.txt — no-adl — no-extra- nonce -P –T

CCMiner (NVIDIA GPU)

CCMiner is a GPU-based miner (NVIDIA)
Command to run your CCMINER:
ccminer-x64.exe -a x13 -o stratum+tcp://poolcore.bitcoinrh.org:3062 -O :without -D — show-diff

Baikal miner

Settings: Url:
(0–2 GH/s) stratum+tcp://poolcore.bitcoinrh.org:3062
(3–4 GH/s) stratum+tcp://poolcore.bitcoinrh.org:3063
(5+ GH/s) stratum+tcp://poolcore.bitcoinrh.org:3064
Algo: x13User: your XRC receiving address (make sure you set 2 distinct addresses for each hashing board)
Pass: x
Extranonce: leave off Priority set to 0 and 1
Once pool stratum address and your wallet as user are set up you should see your miner mining against XRC pool. When miner is working the status column is green. The pool and miner are incorrectly configured now as status says “Dead” highlighted in red.

Instructions for mining XRC on BSOD pool

Pool link: bsod.pw/en/pool/dashboard/XRC/
Use this code for your miner: -a x13 -o stratum+tcp://pool.bsod.pw:2582 -u WALLET.rig
BSOD pool allows both solo and party mining.
For solo mining use code: -a x13 -o stratum+tcp://pool.bsod.pw:2582 -u WALLET.rig -p m=solo And for party mining use: -a x13 -o stratum+tcp://pool.bsod.pw:2582 -u WALLET.rig -p m=party.yourpassword
NOTICE: You can use us for North America and asia for Asia instead of euin your .bat file or config.
You can also use BSOD pool’s monitor app for Android and iOS.

Instructions for mining XRC on ZERGPOOL

Zergpool offers low fees (just 0.5%) and also SOLO and PARTY mining with no extra fees.
To mine XRC on Zergpool use this command lines for your miner:
Regular: -a x13 -o stratum+tcp://x13.mine.zergpool.com:3633 -u -p c=XRC,mc=XRC Solo: -a x13 -o stratum+tcp://x13.mine.zergpool.com:3633 -u -p c=XRC,mc=XRC,m=solo Party: -a x13 -o stratum+tcp://x13.mine.zergpool.com:3633 -u -p c=XRC,mc=XRC,m=party
Use your coin wallet address as username in mining software. Specify c=SYMBOL as password to identify payout wallet coin, and the same coin in mc=SYMBOL to specify mining coin.
For more information and support please visit http://zergpool.com
Notice that when there are more pools mining XRC in different geographic/availability locations choose the nearest to you as lowest priority and then add desirable fall back pool options in different geographic locations or pools. This is useful when one pool experiences issues, to fall back to different pool in Bitcoin Rhodium network.

Calculate your Bitcoin Rhodium mining profitability

WhatToMine: https://whattomine.com/coins/317-xrc-x13
CoinCalculators: https://www.coincalculators.io/coin/bitcoin-rhodium

Feel free to ask questions in Discord community. There are lots of helpful people around the world watching XRC 24x7.

Bitcoin Rhodium Dev Team
submitted by BitcoinRh to BitcoinRhodium [link] [comments]

How does the mining software "guess" the correct nonce?

Hello,
I was giving a tutorial to my friend about how Bitcoin works and he had a few good questions I couldn't answer definitively.
I was explaining how a miner "guesses" randomly to solve a hash/puzzle. He is aware of how hashing works. I told him how the miner is trying to guess an input to get a desired output of a certain amount of leading zeros. Here are some scenarios he laid out and my answers to them. Was I correct?
Q1: If I'm a miner with multiple machines, why wouldn't I tell each machine to guess random numbers within a certain range, with each range being different? That way I don't waste time or energy potentially guessing a number I already tried.
A1: The amount of numbers to guess is infinite, even if one machine had a range of [1-100000000000], the other would have to guess between [100000000001-infinity], the amount of energy or time saved would be insignificant.
Q2: They could set a range for each machine that didn't go to infinity, so one machine could randomly guess from [1-9999], the second machine could guess [10000-19999], and when the first machine finished its first range, it could go to [20000-29999] and so on.
A2: When guessing from a range of numbers that stretch to infinity, the chances of guessing the same number twice are so small that it likely doesn't matter at all, and devoting even that little amount of power or memory to have the miners switch alternating sets is a worse trade off then potentially guessing an already guessed number.
Are my answers to the above scenarios correct? If not, why? And am I missing a fundamental of mining (for instance, we are assuming you can even edit the process in which a miner mines)?
I have already successfully answered two of his other scenarios:
Q: Why don't they guess linearly to avoid guessing a number twice?
A: Because if someone else is doing the same thing, but quicker, you guarantee you will never successfully mine a block.
And
Q: Why doesn't a miner with multiple machines keep track of which numbers are guessed and communicate that to all of his machines to avoid guessing the same number?
A: It would definitely take more resources to store and communicate that information than it would save to avoid guessing the same number twice.
submitted by Gaditonecy to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

How did Satoshi get his 1 million BTC?

I know it was his idea but did he just give himself 1 million Bitcoins or did he have to pay for them?
submitted by BitcoinAlways to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Decred Roundtable Ep. 3 Live Tonight! Politeia, Staking, and Launch Analysis

Decred Roundtable Ep. 3 Live Tonight! Politeia, Staking, and Launch Analysis submitted by dezryth to decred [link] [comments]

Where does the ASIC get the nonce from?

Every time the miner tries to hash (the block?) it uses a nonce (random number) How is this chosen? Randomly? in sequence? in sequence from a certain point? Who assigns it?
The ASIC? The mining software? [the cpu] The pool? If the pool - what about peer-pooling?
AND could this be improved to reduce 'wasted' work globally - or to the advantage of the pool?
Thanks for any answers!
I am becoming more concerned that there are only incentives to centralise, and not de-centralise ... which works against bitcoin's nature (and strengths)
submitted by inteblio to BitcoinMining [link] [comments]

Sidechain headers on mainchain (unification of drivechains and spv proofs) | ZmnSCPxj | Sep 05 2017

ZmnSCPxj on Sep 05 2017:
Good morning all,
I have started to consider a unification of drivechains, blind merged mining, and sidechain SPV proofs to form yet another solution for sidechains.
Briefly, below are the starting assumptions:
  1. SPV proofs are a short chain of sidechain block headers. This is used to prove to the mainchain that some fund has been locked in the sidechain and the mainchain should unlock an equivalent fund to the redeemer.
  2. SPV proofs are large and even in compact form, are still large. We can instead use miner voting to control whether some mainchain fund should be unlocked. Presumably, the mainchain miners are monitoring that the sidechain is operating correctly and can know directly if a side-to-main peg is valid.
  3. To maintain mainchain's security, we should use merged mining for sidechain mining rather than have a separate set of miners for mainchain and each sidechain.
  4. A blockchain is just a singly-linked list. Genesis block is the NULL of the list. Additional blocks are added at the "front" of the singly-linked list. In Bitcoin, the Merkle tree root is the "pointer to head" and the previous block header ID is the "pointer to tail"; additional data like proof-of-work nonce, timestamp, and version bits exist but are not inherent parts of the blockchain linked list.
  5. In addition to SPV proofs, we should also support reorg proofs. Basically, a reorg proof is a longer SPV proof that shows that a previous SPV proof is invalid.

With those, I present the idea, "sidechain headers in mainchain".
Let us modify Sztorc's OP_BRIBEVERIFY to require the below SCRIPT to use:
OP_BRIBEVERIFY OP_DROP OP_DROP OP_DROP
We also require that be filled only once per mainchain block, as per the "blind" merge mining of Sztorc.
The key insight is that the and are, in fact, the sidechain header. Concatenating those data and hashing them is the block header hash. Just as additional information (like extranonce and witness commitment) are put in the mainchain coinbase transaction, any additional information that the sidechain would have wanted to put in its header can be committed to in the sidechain's equivalent of a coinbase transaction (i.e. a sidechain header transaction).
(All three pieces of data can be "merged" into a single very long data push to reduce the number of OP_DROP operations, this is a detail)
Thus, the sidechain header chain (but not the block data) is embedded in the mainchain itself.
Thus, SPV proofs do not need to present new data to the mainchain. Instead, the mainchain already embeds the SPV proof, since the headers are already in the mainchain's blocks. All that is needed to unlock a lockbox is to provide some past sidechain header hash (or possibly just a previous mainchain block that contains the sidechain header hash, to make it easier for mainchain nodes to look up) and the Merkle path to a sidechain-side side-to-main peg transaction. If the sidechain header chain is "long enough" (for example, 288 sidechain block headers) then it is presumably SPV-safe to release the funds on the mainchain side.

Suppose a sidechain is reorganized, while a side-to-main peg transaction is in the sidechain that is to be reorganized away.
Let us make our example simpler by requiring an SPV proof to be only 4 sidechain block headers.
In the example below, small letters are sidechain block headers to be reorganized, large letters are sidechain block headers that will be judged valid. The sidechain block header "Aa" is the fork point. b' is the sidechain block containing the side-to-main peg that is lost.
Remember, for each mainchain block, only a single sidechain block header for a particular sidechain ID can be added.
The numbers in this example below are mainchain block height numbers.
0: Aa
1: b'
2: c
4: C
5: d
6: D
7: E
8: F
9: G
10: H <- b' side-to-main is judged as "not valid"
Basically, in case of a sidechain fork, the mainchain considers the longest chain to be valid if it is longer by the SPV proof required length. In the above, at mainchain block 10, the sidechain H is now 4 blocks (H,G,F,E) longer than the other sidechain fork that ended at d.
Mainchain nodes can validate this rule because the sidechain headers are embedded in the mainchain block's coinbase. Thus, mainchain fullnodes can validate this part of the sidechain rule of "longest work chain".

Suppose I wish to steal funds from sidechain, by stealing the sidechain lockboxes on the mainchain. I can use the OP_BRIBEVERIFY opcode which Sztorc has graciously provided to cause miners that are otherwise uninterested in the sidechain to put random block headers on a sidechain fork. Since the mainchain nodes are not going to verify the sidechain blocks (and are unaware of sidechain block formats in detail, just the sidechain block headers), I can get away with this on the mainchain.
However, to do so, I need to pay OP_BRIBEVERIFY multiple times. If our rule is 288 sidechain blocks for an SPV proof, then I need to pay OP_BRIBEVERIFY 288 times.
This can then be used to reduce the risk of theft. If lockboxes have a limit in value, or are fixed in value, that maximum/fixed value can be made small enough that paying OP_BRIBEVERIFY 288 times is likely to be more expensive than the lockbox value.
In addition, because only one sidechain header can be put for each mainchain header, I will also need to compete with legitimate users of the sidechain. Those users may devote some of their mainchain funds to keep the sidechain alive and valid by paying OP_BRIBEVERIFY themselves. They will reject my invalid sidechain block and build from a fork point before my theft attempt.
Because the rule is that the longest sidechain must beat the second-longest chain by 288 (or however many) sidechain block headers, legitimate users of the sidechain will impede my progress to successful theft. This makes it less attractive for me to attempt to steal from the sidechain.
The effect is that legitimate users are generating reorg proofs while I try to complete my SPV proof. As the legitimate users increase their fork, I need to keep up and overtake them. This can make it unattractive for me to steal from the sidechain.
Note however that we assume here that a side-to-main peg cannot occur more often than an entire SPV proof period.

Suppose I am a major power with influence over >51% of mainchain miners. What happens if I use that influence to cause the greatest damage to the sidechain?
I can simply ask my miners to create invalid side-to-main pegs that unlock the sidechain's lockboxes. With a greater than 51% of mainchain miners, I do not need to do anything like attempt to double-spend mainchain UTXO's. Instead, I can simply ask my miners to operate correctly to mainchain rules, but violate sidechain rules and steal the sidechain's lockboxes.
With greater than 51% of mainchain miners, I can extend my invalid sidechain until we reach the minimum necessary SPV proof. Assuming a two-way race between legitimate users of the sidechain and me, since I have >51% of mainchain miners, I can build the SPV proof faster than the legitimate users can create a reorg proof against me. This is precisely the same situation that causes drivechain to fail.
An alternative is to require that miners participating in sidechains to check the sidechain in full, and to consider mainchain blocks containing invalid sidechain headers as invalid. However, this greatly increases the amount of data that a full miner needs to be able to receive and verify, effectively increasing centralization risk for the mainchain.

The central idea of drivechain is simply that miners vote on the validity of sidechain side-to-main pegs. But this is effectively the same as miners - and/or OP_BRIBEVERIFY users - only putting valid sidechain block headers on top of valid sidechain block headers. Thus, if we instead use sidechain-headers-on-mainchain, the "vote" that the sidechain side-to-main peg is valid, is the same as a valid merge-mine of the sidechain.
SPV proofs are unnecessary in drivechain. In sidechain-header-on-mainchain, SPV proofs are already embedded in the mainchain. In drivechain, we ask mainchain fullnodes to trust miners. In sidechain-header-on-mainchain, mainchain fullnodes validate SPV proofs on the mainchain, without trusting anyone and without running sidechain software.
To validate the mainchain, a mainchain node keeps a data structure for each existing sidechain's fork.
When the sidechain is first created (perhaps by some special transaction that creates the sidechain's genesis block header and/or sidechain ID, possibly with some proof-of-burn to ensure that Bitcoin users do not arbitrarily create "useless" sidechains, but still allowing permissionless creation of sidechains), the mainchain node creates that data structure.
The data structure contains:
  1. A sidechain block height, a large number initially 0 at sidechain genesis.
  2. A side-to-main peg pointer, which may be NULL, and which also includes a block height at which the side-to-main peg is.
  3. Links to other forks of the same sidechain ID, if any.
  4. The top block header hash of the sidechain (sidechain tip).
If the sidechain's block header on a mainchain block is the direct descendant of the current sidechain tip, we just update the top block header hash and increment the block height.
If there is a side-to-main peg on the sidechain block header, if the side-to-main peg pointer is NULL, we initialize it and store the block height at which the side-to-main peg exists. If there i...[message truncated here by reddit bot]...
original: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-Septembe014910.html
submitted by dev_list_bot to bitcoin_devlist [link] [comments]

Could someone please give me an in-depth explanation of how miners receive Bitcoins?

I know that if a computer is mining solo (which is typically not the case these days for most causal consumers) and it successfully hashes a block the designated address receives something like 25 BTC (but I believe this value decreases over time). What I don't know is specifically where does this BTC transaction come from. Could someone please explain to me how these bitcoins get added to the block chain and what sort of hardware / software is responsible for their generation?
submitted by CostaRicanConnection to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Weekly Dev Update : #2

Update from the devs!
The dashboard (https://testnet.explore.veriblock.org) is still catching up from the redeploy, but testnet is up and running. Here are the release notes. I'll also send an update once the dashboard is caught up.
== Change log 0.1.2 ==
NodeCore
CLI
PoW
PoP
== Action == Action: this is a breaking change to the protocol. Please download the latest rc.1.2 package, and update your nodecore instance.
To keep any coins you have mined, please copy over the wallet.dat file, as well as the other created files from the original nodecore directory to a new subfolder "nodecore\bin\testnet". If "testnet" folder does not exist, then please create it. If you do not have testnet coins that you're keeping, then no action required.
== Documentation == There is updated documentation on the wiki: https://wiki.veriblock.org These pages may be of special interest:
Reference:
How To:
submitted by VeriBlock to VeriBlock [link] [comments]

Let's try something different. I want to auction my domain [extranonce.com] for BTC. Any takers?

Hey guys, long time lurker. I thought this would be a cool way of leveraging BTC to sell an online good. Any takers? Bidding starts at 0.0242 Bitcoin ($10 dollars USD)
my address is 13S56WUXFTsPrE55j4Qdye1SPnqnVSuSea
$ dig -t txt extranonce.com ; <<>> DiG 9.8.3-P1 <<>> -t txt extranonce.com ;; global options: +cmd ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 4218 ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 0 ;; QUESTION SECTION: ;extranonce.com. IN TXT ;; ANSWER SECTION: extranonce.com. 1799 IN TXT "v=spf1 include:spf.efwd.registrar-servers.com ~all" extranonce.com. 1798 IN TXT "patfriedrice-13S56WUXFTsPrE55j4Qdye1SPnqnVSuSea" 
submitted by patfriedrice to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Bitcoin-development Digest, Vol 48, Issue 62 | Damian Gomez | May 11 2015

Damian Gomez on May 11 2015:
Hllo
I want to build from a conversation that I had w/ Peter (T?) regarding the
increase in block size in the bitcoin from its's current structure would be
the proposasl of an prepend to the hash chain itself that would be the
first DER decoded script in order to verify integrity(trust) within a set
of transactions and the originiator themselves.
It is my belief that the process to begin a new encryption tool using a
variant of the WinterNitz OTS for its existential unforgeability to be the
added signatures with every Wallet transaction in order to provide a
consesnus systemt that takes into accont a personal level of intergrity for
the intention fo a transaction to occur. This signature would then be
hashes for there to be an intermediate proxy state that then verifies and
evaluates the trust fucntion for the receiving trnsactions. This
evaluation loop would itself be a state in which the mining power and the
rewards derived from them would be an increased level of integrity as
provided for the "brainers" of a systems who are then the "signatuers" of
the transaction authenticity, and additiaonally program extranonces of x
bits {72} in order to have a double valid signature that the rest of the
nodes would accept in order to have a valid address from which to be able
to continuously receive transactions.
There is a level of diffculty in obtaining brainers, fees would only apply
uin so much as they are able to create authentic transactions based off the
voting power of the rest of the received nodes. The greater number of
faults within the system from a brainer then the more, so would his
computational power be restricted in order to provide a reward feedback
system. This singularity in a Byzantine consensus is only achieved if the
route of an appropriate transformation occurs, one that is invariant to the
participants of the system, thus being able to provide initial vector
transformations from a person's online identity is the responsibilty that
we have to ensure and calulate a lagrangian method that utilisizes a set of
convolutional neural network funcitons [backpropagation, fuzzy logic] and
and tranformation function taking the vectors of tranformations in a
kahunen-loeve algorithm and using the convergence of a baryon wave function
in order to proceed with a baseline reading of the current level of
integrity in the state today that is an instance of actionable acceleration
within a system.
This is something that I am trying to continue to parse out. Therefore
there are still heavy questions to be answered(the most important being the
consent of the people to measure their own levels of integrity through
mined information)> There must always be the option to disconnect from a
transactional system where payments occur in order to allow a level of
solace and peace within individuals -- withour repercussions and a seperate
system that supports the offline realm as well. (THis is a design problem)
Ultimately, quite literally such a transaction system could exist to
provide detailed analysis that promotes integrity being the basis for
sharing information. The fee structure would be eliminated, due to the
level of integrity and procesing power to have messages and transactions
and reviews of unfiduciary responsible orgnizations be merited as highly
true (.9 in fizzy logic) in order to promote a well-being in the state.
That is its own reward, the strenght of having more processing speed.
FYI(thank you to peter whom nudged my thinking and interest (again) in this
area. )
This is something I am attempting to design in order to program it. Though
I am not an expert and my technology stack is limited to java and c (and my
issues from it). I provided a class the other day the was pseudo code for
the beginning of the consensus. Now I might to now if I am missing any of
teh technical paradigms that might make this illogical? I now with the
advent of 7petabyte computers one could easily store 2.5 petabytes of human
information for just an instance of integrity not to mention otehr
emotions.
*Also, might someone be able to provide a bit of information on Bitcoin
core project?*
thank you again. Damain.
On Mon, May 11, 2015 at 10:29 AM, <
bitcoin-development-request at lists.sourceforge.net> wrote:
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When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of Bitcoin-development digest..."
Today's Topics:
  1. Fwd: Bitcoin core 0.11 planning (Wladimir)
  2. Re: Bitcoin core 0.11 planning (Wladimir)
  3. Long-term mining incentives (Thomas Voegtlin)
  4. Re: Long-term mining incentives
    (insecurity at national.shitposting.agency)
  5. Re: Reducing the block rate instead of increasing the maximum
    block size (Luke Dashjr)
  6. Re: Long-term mining incentives (Gavin Andresen)
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Wladimir <laanwj at gmail.com>
To: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net>
Cc:
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 14:49:53 +0000
Subject: [Bitcoin-development] Fwd: Bitcoin core 0.11 planning
On Tue, Apr 28, 2015 at 11:01 AM, Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille at gmail.com>
wrote:
As softforks almost certainly require backports to older releases and
other
software anyway, I don't think they should necessarily be bound to
Bitcoin
Core major releases. If they don't require large code changes, we can
easily
do them in minor releases too.
Agree here - there is no need to time consensus changes with a major
release, as they need to be ported back to older releases anyhow.
(I don't really classify them as software features, but properties of
the underlying system that we need to adopt to)
Wladimir
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Wladimir <laanwj at gmail.com>
To: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net>
Cc:
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 15:00:03 +0000
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Bitcoin core 0.11 planning
A reminder - feature freeze and string freeze is coming up this Friday the
15th.
Let me know if your pull request is ready to be merged before then,
Wladimir
On Tue, Apr 28, 2015 at 7:44 AM, Wladimir J. van der Laan
<laanwj at gmail.com> wrote:
Hello all,
The release window for 0.11 is nearing, I'd propose the following
schedule:
2015-05-01 Soft translation string freeze
 Open Transifex translations for 0.11 Finalize and close translation for 0.9 
2015-05-15 Feature freeze, string freeze
2015-06-01 Split off 0.11 branch
 Tag and release 0.11.0rc1 Start merging for 0.12 on master branch 
2015-07-01 Release 0.11.0 final (aim)
In contrast to former releases, which were protracted for months, let's
try to be more strict about the dates. Of course it is always possible for
last-minute critical issues to interfere with the planning. The release
will not be held up for features, though, and anything that will not make
it to 0.11 will be postponed to next release scheduled for end of the year.
Wladimir
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Thomas Voegtlin <thomasv at electrum.org>
To: Bitcoin Development <bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net>
Cc:
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 18:28:46 +0200
Subject: [Bitcoin-development] Long-term mining incentives
The discussion on block size increase has brought some attention to the
other elephant in the room: Long-term mining incentives.
Bitcoin derives its current market value from the assumption that a
stable, steady-state regime will be reached in the future, where miners
have an incentive to keep mining to protect the network. Such a steady
state regime does not exist today, because miners get most of their
reward from the block subsidy, which will progressively be removed.
Thus, today's 3 billion USD question is the following: Will a steady
state regime be reached in the future? Can such a regime exist? What are
the necessary conditions for its existence?
Satoshi's paper suggests that this may be achieved through miner fees.
Quite a few people seem to take this for granted, and are working to
make it happen (developing cpfp and replace-by-fee). This explains part
of the opposition to raising the block size limit; some people would
like to see some fee pressure building up first, in order to get closer
to a regime where miners are incentivised by transaction fees instead of
block subsidy. Indeed, the emergence of a working fee market would be
extremely reassuring for the long-term viability of bitcoin. So, the
thinking goes, by raising the block size limit, we would be postponing a
crucial reality check. We would be buying time, at the expenses of
Bitcoin's decentralization.
OTOH, proponents of a block size increase have a very good point: if the
block size is not raised soon, Bitcoin is going to enter a new, unknown
and potentially harmful regime. In the current regime, almost all
transaction get confirmed quickly, and fee pressure does not exist. Mike
Hearn suggested that, when blocks reach full capacity and users start to
experience confirmation delays and confirmation uncertainty, users will
simply go away and stop using Bitcoin. To me, that outcome sounds very
plausible indeed. Thus, proponents of the block size increase are
conservative; they are trying to preserve the current regime, which is
known to work, instead of letting the network enter uncharted territory.
My problem is that this seems to lacks a vision. If the maximal block
size is increased only to buy time, or because some people think that 7
tps is not enough to compete with VISA, then I guess it would be
healthier to try and develop off-chain infrastructure first, such as the
Lightning network.
OTOH, I also fail to see evidence that a limited block capacity will
lead to a functional fee market, able to sustain a steady state. A
functional market requires well-informed participants who make rational
choices and accept the outcomes of their choices. That is not the case
today, and to believe that it will magically happen because blocks start
to reach full capacity sounds a lot like like wishful thinking.
So here is my question, to both proponents and opponents of a block size
increase: What steady-state regime do you envision for Bitcoin, and what
is is your plan to get there? More specifically, how will the
steady-state regime look like? Will users experience fee pressure and
delays, or will it look more like a scaled up version of what we enjoy
today? Should fee pressure be increased jointly with subsidy decrease,
or as soon as possible, or never? What incentives will exist for miners
once the subsidy is gone? Will miners have an incentive to permanently
fork off the last block and capture its fees? Do you expect Bitcoin to
work because miners are altruistic/selfish/honest/caring?
A clear vision would be welcome.
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: insecurity at national.shitposting.agency
To: thomasv at electrum.org
Cc: bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 16:52:10 +0000
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Long-term mining incentives
On 2015-05-11 16:28, Thomas Voegtlin wrote:
My problem is that this seems to lacks a vision. If the maximal block
size is increased only to buy time, or because some people think that 7
tps is not enough to compete with VISA, then I guess it would be
healthier to try and develop off-chain infrastructure first, such as the
Lightning network.
If your end goal is "compete with VISA" you might as well just give up
and go home right now. There's lots of terrible proposals where people
try to demonstrate that so many hundred thousand transactions a second
are possible if we just make the block size 500GB. In the real world
with physical limits, you literally can not verify more than a few
thousand ECDSA signatures a second on a CPU core. The tradeoff taken
in Bitcoin is that the signatures are pretty small, but they are also
slow to verify on any sort of scale. There's no way competing with a
centralised entity using on-chain transactions is even a sane goal.
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Luke Dashjr <luke at dashjr.org>
To: bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
Cc:
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 16:47:47 +0000
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Reducing the block rate instead of
increasing the maximum block size
On Monday, May 11, 2015 7:03:29 AM Sergio Lerner wrote:
  1. It will encourage centralization, because participants of mining
pools will loose more money because of excessive initial block template
latency, which leads to higher stale shares
When a new block is solved, that information needs to propagate
throughout the Bitcoin network up to the mining pool operator nodes,
then a new block header candidate is created, and this header must be
propagated to all the mining pool users, ether by a push or a pull
model. Generally the mining server pushes new work units to the
individual miners. If done other way around, the server would need to
handle a high load of continuous work requests that would be difficult
to distinguish from a DDoS attack. So if the server pushes new block
header candidates to clients, then the problem boils down to increasing
bandwidth of the servers to achieve a tenfold increase in work
distribution. Or distributing the servers geographically to achieve a
lower latency. Propagating blocks does not require additional CPU
resources, so mining pools administrators would need to increase
moderately their investment in the server infrastructure to achieve
lower latency and higher bandwidth, but I guess the investment would be
low.
  1. Latency is what matters here, not bandwidth so much. And latency
reduction
is either expensive or impossible.
  1. Mining pools are mostly run at a loss (with exception to only the most
centralised pools), and have nothing to invest in increasing
infrastructure.
3, It will reduce the security of the network
The security of the network is based on two facts:
A- The miners are incentivized to extend the best chain
B- The probability of a reversal based on a long block competition
decreases as more confirmation blocks are appended.
C- Renting or buying hardware to perform a 51% attack is costly.
A still holds. B holds for the same amount of confirmation blocks, so 6
confirmation blocks in a 10-minute block-chain is approximately
equivalent to 6 confirmation blocks in a 1-minute block-chain.
Only C changes, as renting the hashing power for 6 minutes is ten times
less expensive as renting it for 1 hour. However, there is no shop where
one can find 51% of the hashing power to rent right now, nor probably
will ever be if Bitcoin succeeds. Last, you can still have a 1 hour
confirmation (60 1-minute blocks) if you wish for high-valued payments,
so the security decreases only if participant wish to decrease it.
You're overlooking at least:
  1. The real network has to suffer wasted work as a result of the stale
blocks,
while an attacker does not. If 20% of blocks are stale, the attacker only
needs 40% of the legitimate hashrate to achieve 50%-in-practice.
  1. Since blocks are individually weaker, it becomes cheaper to DoS nodes
with
invalid blocks. (not sure if this is a real concern, but it ought to be
considered and addressed)
  1. Reducing the block propagation time on the average case is good, but
what happen in the worse case?
Most methods proposed to reduce the block propagation delay do it only
on the average case. Any kind of block compression relies on both
parties sharing some previous information. In the worse case it's true
that a miner can create and try to broadcast a block that takes too much
time to verify or bandwidth to transmit. This is currently true on the
Bitcoin network. Nevertheless there is no such incentive for miners,
since they will be shooting on their own foots. Peter Todd has argued
that the best strategy for miners is actually to reach 51% of the
network, but not more. In other words, to exclude the slowest 49%
percent. But this strategy of creating bloated blocks is too risky in
practice, and surely doomed to fail, as network conditions dynamically
change. Also it would be perceived as an attack to the network, and the
miner (if it is a public mining pool) would be probably blacklisted.
One can probably overcome changing network conditions merely by trying to
reach 75% and exclude the slowest 25%. Also, there is no way to identify or
blacklist miners.
  1. Thousands of SPV wallets running in mobile devices would need to be
upgraded (thanks Mike).
That depends on the current upgrade rate for SPV wallets like Bitcoin
Wallet and BreadWallet. Suppose that the upgrade rate is 80%/year: we
develop the source code for the change now and apply the change in Q2
2016, then most of the nodes will already be upgraded by when the
hardfork takes place. Also a public notice telling people to upgrade in
web pages, bitcointalk, SPV wallets warnings, coindesk, one year in
advance will give plenty of time to SPV wallet users to upgrade.
I agree this shouldn't be a real concern. SPV wallets are also more likely
and
less risky (globally) to be auto-updated.
  1. If there are 10x more blocks, then there are 10x more block headers,
and that increases the amount of bandwidth SPV wallets need to catch up
with the chain
A standard smartphone with average cellular downstream speed downloads
2.6 headers per second (1600 kbits/sec) [3], so if synchronization were
to be done only at night when the phone is connected to the power line,
then it would take 9 minutes to synchronize with 1440 headers/day. If a
person should accept a payment, and the smart-phone is 1 day
out-of-synch, then it takes less time to download all the missing
headers than to wait for a 10-minute one block confirmation. Obviously
all smartphones with 3G have a downstream bandwidth much higher,
averaging 1 Mbps. So the whole synchronization will be done less than a
1-minute block confirmation.
Uh, I think you need to be using at least median speeds. As an example, I
can
only sustain (over 3G) about 40 kbps, with a peak of around 400 kbps. 3G
has
worse range/coverage than 2G. No doubt the average is skewed so high
because
of densely populated areas like San Francisco having 400+ Mbps cellular
data.
It's not reasonable to assume sync only at night: most payments will be
during
the day, on battery - so increased power use must also be considered.
According to CISCO mobile bandwidth connection speed increases 20% every
year.
Only in small densely populated areas of first-world countries.
Luke
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Gavin Andresen <gavinandresen at gmail.com>
To: insecurity at national.shitposting.agency
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net>
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 13:29:02 -0400
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Long-term mining incentives
I think long-term the chain will not be secured purely by proof-of-work. I
think when the Bitcoin network was tiny running solely on people's home
computers proof-of-work was the right way to secure the chain, and the only
fair way to both secure the chain and distribute the coins.
See https://gist.github.com/gavinandresen/630d4a6c24ac6144482a for some
half-baked thoughts along those lines. I don't think proof-of-work is the
last word in distributed consensus (I also don't think any alternatives are
anywhere near ready to deploy, but they might be in ten years).
I also think it is premature to worry about what will happen in twenty or
thirty years when the block subsidy is insignificant. A lot will happen in
the next twenty years. I could spin a vision of what will secure the chain
in twenty years, but I'd put a low probability on that vision actually
turning out to be correct.
That is why I keep saying Bitcoin is an experiment. But I also believe
that the incentives are correct, and there are a lot of very motivated,
smart, hard-working people who will make it work. When you're talking about
trying to predict what will happen decades from now, I think that is the
best you can (honestly) do.

Gavin Andresen
One dashboard for servers and applications across Physical-Virtual-Cloud
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Deep dive visibility with transaction tracing using APM Insight.
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Bitcoin-development mailing list
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Bitcoin-development Digest, Vol 48, Issue 63 | Damian Gomez | May 11 2015

Damian Gomez on May 11 2015:
Btw How awful that I didn't cite my sources, please exucse me, this is
definitely not my intention sometimes I get too caught up in my own
excitemtnt
1) Martin, J., Alvisi, L., Fast Byzantine Consensus. *IEEE Transactions on
Dependable and Secure Computing. 2006. *3(3) doi: Please see
John-Phillipe Martin and Lorenzo ALvisi
2) https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/191.pdf One_Time Winternitz Signatures.
On Mon, May 11, 2015 at 1:20 PM, <
bitcoin-development-request at lists.sourceforge.net> wrote:
Send Bitcoin-development mailing list submissions to
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To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
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When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of Bitcoin-development digest..."
Today's Topics:
  1. Re: Bitcoin-development Digest, Vol 48, Issue 62 (Damian Gomez)
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Damian Gomez <dgomez1092 at gmail.com>
To: bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
Cc:
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 13:20:46 -0700
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Bitcoin-development Digest, Vol 48,
Issue 62
Hllo
I want to build from a conversation that I had w/ Peter (T?) regarding the
increase in block size in the bitcoin from its's current structure would be
the proposasl of an prepend to the hash chain itself that would be the
first DER decoded script in order to verify integrity(trust) within a set
of transactions and the originiator themselves.
It is my belief that the process to begin a new encryption tool using a
variant of the WinterNitz OTS for its existential unforgeability to be the
added signatures with every Wallet transaction in order to provide a
consesnus systemt that takes into accont a personal level of intergrity for
the intention fo a transaction to occur. This signature would then be
hashes for there to be an intermediate proxy state that then verifies and
evaluates the trust fucntion for the receiving trnsactions. This
evaluation loop would itself be a state in which the mining power and the
rewards derived from them would be an increased level of integrity as
provided for the "brainers" of a systems who are then the "signatuers" of
the transaction authenticity, and additiaonally program extranonces of x
bits {72} in order to have a double valid signature that the rest of the
nodes would accept in order to have a valid address from which to be able
to continuously receive transactions.
There is a level of diffculty in obtaining brainers, fees would only apply
uin so much as they are able to create authentic transactions based off the
voting power of the rest of the received nodes. The greater number of
faults within the system from a brainer then the more, so would his
computational power be restricted in order to provide a reward feedback
system. This singularity in a Byzantine consensus is only achieved if the
route of an appropriate transformation occurs, one that is invariant to the
participants of the system, thus being able to provide initial vector
transformations from a person's online identity is the responsibilty that
we have to ensure and calulate a lagrangian method that utilisizes a set of
convolutional neural network funcitons [backpropagation, fuzzy logic] and
and tranformation function taking the vectors of tranformations in a
kahunen-loeve algorithm and using the convergence of a baryon wave function
in order to proceed with a baseline reading of the current level of
integrity in the state today that is an instance of actionable acceleration
within a system.
This is something that I am trying to continue to parse out. Therefore
there are still heavy questions to be answered(the most important being the
consent of the people to measure their own levels of integrity through
mined information)> There must always be the option to disconnect from a
transactional system where payments occur in order to allow a level of
solace and peace within individuals -- withour repercussions and a seperate
system that supports the offline realm as well. (THis is a design problem)
Ultimately, quite literally such a transaction system could exist to
provide detailed analysis that promotes integrity being the basis for
sharing information. The fee structure would be eliminated, due to the
level of integrity and procesing power to have messages and transactions
and reviews of unfiduciary responsible orgnizations be merited as highly
true (.9 in fizzy logic) in order to promote a well-being in the state.
That is its own reward, the strenght of having more processing speed.
FYI(thank you to peter whom nudged my thinking and interest (again) in
this area. )
This is something I am attempting to design in order to program it. Though
I am not an expert and my technology stack is limited to java and c (and my
issues from it). I provided a class the other day the was pseudo code for
the beginning of the consensus. Now I might to now if I am missing any of
teh technical paradigms that might make this illogical? I now with the
advent of 7petabyte computers one could easily store 2.5 petabytes of human
information for just an instance of integrity not to mention otehr
emotions.
*Also, might someone be able to provide a bit of information on Bitcoin
core project?*
thank you again. Damain.
On Mon, May 11, 2015 at 10:29 AM, <
bitcoin-development-request at lists.sourceforge.net> wrote:
Send Bitcoin-development mailing list submissions to
bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
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or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
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You can reach the person managing the list at
bitcoin-development-owner at lists.sourceforge.net
When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of Bitcoin-development digest..."
Today's Topics:
  1. Fwd: Bitcoin core 0.11 planning (Wladimir)
  2. Re: Bitcoin core 0.11 planning (Wladimir)
  3. Long-term mining incentives (Thomas Voegtlin)
  4. Re: Long-term mining incentives
    (insecurity at national.shitposting.agency)
  5. Re: Reducing the block rate instead of increasing the maximum
    block size (Luke Dashjr)
  6. Re: Long-term mining incentives (Gavin Andresen)
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Wladimir <laanwj at gmail.com>
To: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net>
Cc:
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 14:49:53 +0000
Subject: [Bitcoin-development] Fwd: Bitcoin core 0.11 planning
On Tue, Apr 28, 2015 at 11:01 AM, Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille at gmail.com>
wrote:
As softforks almost certainly require backports to older releases and
other
software anyway, I don't think they should necessarily be bound to
Bitcoin
Core major releases. If they don't require large code changes, we can
easily
do them in minor releases too.
Agree here - there is no need to time consensus changes with a major
release, as they need to be ported back to older releases anyhow.
(I don't really classify them as software features, but properties of
the underlying system that we need to adopt to)
Wladimir
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Wladimir <laanwj at gmail.com>
To: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net>
Cc:
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 15:00:03 +0000
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Bitcoin core 0.11 planning
A reminder - feature freeze and string freeze is coming up this Friday
the 15th.
Let me know if your pull request is ready to be merged before then,
Wladimir
On Tue, Apr 28, 2015 at 7:44 AM, Wladimir J. van der Laan
<laanwj at gmail.com> wrote:
Hello all,
The release window for 0.11 is nearing, I'd propose the following
schedule:
2015-05-01 Soft translation string freeze
 Open Transifex translations for 0.11 Finalize and close translation for 0.9 
2015-05-15 Feature freeze, string freeze
2015-06-01 Split off 0.11 branch
 Tag and release 0.11.0rc1 Start merging for 0.12 on master branch 
2015-07-01 Release 0.11.0 final (aim)
In contrast to former releases, which were protracted for months, let's
try to be more strict about the dates. Of course it is always possible for
last-minute critical issues to interfere with the planning. The release
will not be held up for features, though, and anything that will not make
it to 0.11 will be postponed to next release scheduled for end of the year.
Wladimir
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Thomas Voegtlin <thomasv at electrum.org>
To: Bitcoin Development <bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net>
Cc:
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 18:28:46 +0200
Subject: [Bitcoin-development] Long-term mining incentives
The discussion on block size increase has brought some attention to the
other elephant in the room: Long-term mining incentives.
Bitcoin derives its current market value from the assumption that a
stable, steady-state regime will be reached in the future, where miners
have an incentive to keep mining to protect the network. Such a steady
state regime does not exist today, because miners get most of their
reward from the block subsidy, which will progressively be removed.
Thus, today's 3 billion USD question is the following: Will a steady
state regime be reached in the future? Can such a regime exist? What are
the necessary conditions for its existence?
Satoshi's paper suggests that this may be achieved through miner fees.
Quite a few people seem to take this for granted, and are working to
make it happen (developing cpfp and replace-by-fee). This explains part
of the opposition to raising the block size limit; some people would
like to see some fee pressure building up first, in order to get closer
to a regime where miners are incentivised by transaction fees instead of
block subsidy. Indeed, the emergence of a working fee market would be
extremely reassuring for the long-term viability of bitcoin. So, the
thinking goes, by raising the block size limit, we would be postponing a
crucial reality check. We would be buying time, at the expenses of
Bitcoin's decentralization.
OTOH, proponents of a block size increase have a very good point: if the
block size is not raised soon, Bitcoin is going to enter a new, unknown
and potentially harmful regime. In the current regime, almost all
transaction get confirmed quickly, and fee pressure does not exist. Mike
Hearn suggested that, when blocks reach full capacity and users start to
experience confirmation delays and confirmation uncertainty, users will
simply go away and stop using Bitcoin. To me, that outcome sounds very
plausible indeed. Thus, proponents of the block size increase are
conservative; they are trying to preserve the current regime, which is
known to work, instead of letting the network enter uncharted territory.
My problem is that this seems to lacks a vision. If the maximal block
size is increased only to buy time, or because some people think that 7
tps is not enough to compete with VISA, then I guess it would be
healthier to try and develop off-chain infrastructure first, such as the
Lightning network.
OTOH, I also fail to see evidence that a limited block capacity will
lead to a functional fee market, able to sustain a steady state. A
functional market requires well-informed participants who make rational
choices and accept the outcomes of their choices. That is not the case
today, and to believe that it will magically happen because blocks start
to reach full capacity sounds a lot like like wishful thinking.
So here is my question, to both proponents and opponents of a block size
increase: What steady-state regime do you envision for Bitcoin, and what
is is your plan to get there? More specifically, how will the
steady-state regime look like? Will users experience fee pressure and
delays, or will it look more like a scaled up version of what we enjoy
today? Should fee pressure be increased jointly with subsidy decrease,
or as soon as possible, or never? What incentives will exist for miners
once the subsidy is gone? Will miners have an incentive to permanently
fork off the last block and capture its fees? Do you expect Bitcoin to
work because miners are altruistic/selfish/honest/caring?
A clear vision would be welcome.
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: insecurity at national.shitposting.agency
To: thomasv at electrum.org
Cc: bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 16:52:10 +0000
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Long-term mining incentives
On 2015-05-11 16:28, Thomas Voegtlin wrote:
My problem is that this seems to lacks a vision. If the maximal block
size is increased only to buy time, or because some people think that 7
tps is not enough to compete with VISA, then I guess it would be
healthier to try and develop off-chain infrastructure first, such as the
Lightning network.
If your end goal is "compete with VISA" you might as well just give up
and go home right now. There's lots of terrible proposals where people
try to demonstrate that so many hundred thousand transactions a second
are possible if we just make the block size 500GB. In the real world
with physical limits, you literally can not verify more than a few
thousand ECDSA signatures a second on a CPU core. The tradeoff taken
in Bitcoin is that the signatures are pretty small, but they are also
slow to verify on any sort of scale. There's no way competing with a
centralised entity using on-chain transactions is even a sane goal.
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Luke Dashjr <luke at dashjr.org>
To: bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net
Cc:
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 16:47:47 +0000
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Reducing the block rate instead of
increasing the maximum block size
On Monday, May 11, 2015 7:03:29 AM Sergio Lerner wrote:
  1. It will encourage centralization, because participants of mining
pools will loose more money because of excessive initial block template
latency, which leads to higher stale shares
When a new block is solved, that information needs to propagate
throughout the Bitcoin network up to the mining pool operator nodes,
then a new block header candidate is created, and this header must be
propagated to all the mining pool users, ether by a push or a pull
model. Generally the mining server pushes new work units to the
individual miners. If done other way around, the server would need to
handle a high load of continuous work requests that would be difficult
to distinguish from a DDoS attack. So if the server pushes new block
header candidates to clients, then the problem boils down to increasing
bandwidth of the servers to achieve a tenfold increase in work
distribution. Or distributing the servers geographically to achieve a
lower latency. Propagating blocks does not require additional CPU
resources, so mining pools administrators would need to increase
moderately their investment in the server infrastructure to achieve
lower latency and higher bandwidth, but I guess the investment would be
low.
  1. Latency is what matters here, not bandwidth so much. And latency
reduction
is either expensive or impossible.
  1. Mining pools are mostly run at a loss (with exception to only the most
centralised pools), and have nothing to invest in increasing
infrastructure.
3, It will reduce the security of the network
The security of the network is based on two facts:
A- The miners are incentivized to extend the best chain
B- The probability of a reversal based on a long block competition
decreases as more confirmation blocks are appended.
C- Renting or buying hardware to perform a 51% attack is costly.
A still holds. B holds for the same amount of confirmation blocks, so 6
confirmation blocks in a 10-minute block-chain is approximately
equivalent to 6 confirmation blocks in a 1-minute block-chain.
Only C changes, as renting the hashing power for 6 minutes is ten times
less expensive as renting it for 1 hour. However, there is no shop where
one can find 51% of the hashing power to rent right now, nor probably
will ever be if Bitcoin succeeds. Last, you can still have a 1 hour
confirmation (60 1-minute blocks) if you wish for high-valued payments,
so the security decreases only if participant wish to decrease it.
You're overlooking at least:
  1. The real network has to suffer wasted work as a result of the stale
blocks,
while an attacker does not. If 20% of blocks are stale, the attacker only
needs 40% of the legitimate hashrate to achieve 50%-in-practice.
  1. Since blocks are individually weaker, it becomes cheaper to DoS nodes
with
invalid blocks. (not sure if this is a real concern, but it ought to be
considered and addressed)
  1. Reducing the block propagation time on the average case is good, but
what happen in the worse case?
Most methods proposed to reduce the block propagation delay do it only
on the average case. Any kind of block compression relies on both
parties sharing some previous information. In the worse case it's true
that a miner can create and try to broadcast a block that takes too much
time to verify or bandwidth to transmit. This is currently true on the
Bitcoin network. Nevertheless there is no such incentive for miners,
since they will be shooting on their own foots. Peter Todd has argued
that the best strategy for miners is actually to reach 51% of the
network, but not more. In other words, to exclude the slowest 49%
percent. But this strategy of creating bloated blocks is too risky in
practice, and surely doomed to fail, as network conditions dynamically
change. Also it would be perceived as an attack to the network, and the
miner (if it is a public mining pool) would be probably blacklisted.
One can probably overcome changing network conditions merely by trying to
reach 75% and exclude the slowest 25%. Also, there is no way to identify
or
blacklist miners.
  1. Thousands of SPV wallets running in mobile devices would need to be
upgraded (thanks Mike).
That depends on the current upgrade rate for SPV wallets like Bitcoin
Wallet and BreadWallet. Suppose that the upgrade rate is 80%/year: we
develop the source code for the change now and apply the change in Q2
2016, then most of the nodes will already be upgraded by when the
hardfork takes place. Also a public notice telling people to upgrade in
web pages, bitcointalk, SPV wallets warnings, coindesk, one year in
advance will give plenty of time to SPV wallet users to upgrade.
I agree this shouldn't be a real concern. SPV wallets are also more
likely and
less risky (globally) to be auto-updated.
  1. If there are 10x more blocks, then there are 10x more block headers,
and that increases the amount of bandwidth SPV wallets need to catch up
with the chain
A standard smartphone with average cellular downstream speed downloads
2.6 headers per second (1600 kbits/sec) [3], so if synchronization were
to be done only at night when the phone is connected to the power line,
then it would take 9 minutes to synchronize with 1440 headers/day. If a
person should accept a payment, and the smart-phone is 1 day
out-of-synch, then it takes less time to download all the missing
headers than to wait for a 10-minute one block confirmation. Obviously
all smartphones with 3G have a downstream bandwidth much higher,
averaging 1 Mbps. So the whole synchronization will be done less than a
1-minute block confirmation.
Uh, I think you need to be using at least median speeds. As an example, I
can
only sustain (over 3G) about 40 kbps, with a peak of around 400 kbps. 3G
has
worse range/coverage than 2G. No doubt the average is skewed so high
because
of densely populated areas like San Francisco having 400+ Mbps cellular
data.
It's not reasonable to assume sync only at night: most payments will be
during
the day, on battery - so increased power use must also be considered.
According to CISCO mobile bandwidth connection speed increases 20% every
year.
Only in small densely populated areas of first-world countries.
Luke
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Gavin Andresen <gavinandresen at gmail.com>
To: insecurity at national.shitposting.agency
Cc: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development at lists.sourceforge.net>
Date: Mon, 11 May 2015 13:29:02 -0400
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Long-term mining incentives
I think long-term the chain will not be secured purely by proof-of-work.
I think when the Bitcoin network was tiny running solely on people's home
computers proof-of-work was the right way to secure the chain, and the only
fair way to both secure the chain and distribute the coins.
See https://gist.github.com/gavinandresen/630d4a6c24ac6144482a for some
half-baked thoughts along those lines. I don't think proof-of-work is the
last word in distributed consensus (I also don't think any alternatives are
anywhere near ready to deploy, but they might be in ten years).
I also think it is premature to worry about what will happen in twenty or
thirty years when the block subsidy is insignificant. A lot will happen in
the next twenty years. I could spin a vision of what will secure the chain
in twenty years, but I'd put a low probability on that vision actually
turning out to be correct.
That is why I keep saying Bitcoin is an experiment. But I also believe
that the incentives are correct, and there are a lot of very motivated,
smart, hard-working people who will make it work. When you're talking about
trying to predict what will happen decades from now, I think that is the
best you can (honestly) do.

Gavin Andresen
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Can't connect.

I now have 3 AMD GPUs. An old 5850, a 380, and a 290. I know GPU mining is barely profitable, but I have pretty cheap power deep in south TX, a very efficient PSU, and nothing to do with this hardware.
Having some trouble connecting with sgminer, which I built myself from github repo using visual studio (BTW: have there been any attempts at a Thompson Hack?). I haven't tried any other pools yet, I'm a BTC newb but I remember years ago Slushes pool was around, and I figured I'd go to the oldest/biggest pool to get started with, see how it goes, for a month and see if it's profitable. Anyway, here is the error I'm getting.
[01:11:02] No servers were found that could be used to get work from. [01:11:02] Please check the details from the list below of the servers you have input [01:11:02] Most likely you have input the wrong URL, forgotten to add a port, or have not set up workers [01:11:02] Pool: 0 URL: stratum+tcp://stratum.bitcoin.cz:3333 User: Myusername.workera Password: workerpassword [01:11:02] Press any key to exit, or sgminer will try again in 15s. [01:11:17] Testing stratum.bitcoin.cz [01:11:17] Closing stratum.bitcoin.cz socket [01:11:18] No servers were found that could be used to get work from. [01:11:18] Please check the details from the list below of the servers you have input [01:11:18] Most likely you have input the wrong URL, forgotten to add a port, or have not set up workers [01:11:18] Pool: 0 URL: stratum+tcp://stratum.bitcoin.cz:3333 User: Myusername.workera Password: workerpassword [01:11:18] Press any key to exit, or sgminer will try again in 15s. [01:11:18] stratum.bitcoin.cz difficulty changed to 256 [01:11:18] stratum.bitcoin.cz JSON stratum auth failed: [ -3, "mining.extranonce.subscribe", null ]

Here is my slushpool.conf file

{ "pools" : [ { "url" : "stratum+tcp://stratum.bitcoin.cz:3333", "user" : "Myusername.workera", "pass" : "garbageBecauseDocsSayNotNeeded"
 } 
] , "intensity" : "13", "worksize" : "256", "lookup-gap" : "2", "thread-concurrency" : "8193", "temp-cutoff" : "90", "expiry" : "1", "failover-only" : true, "log" : "5", "queue" : "0", "scan-time" : "1", "device" : "0", "gpu-threads" : "2" }

And my slushpool.bat file

setx GPU_MAX_ALLOC_PERCENT 95 setx GPU_USE_SYNC_OBJECTS 1 timeout /t 4 sgminer --config slushpool.conf --log-file logfile.txt
PS: device0 is my 380, I know it's not optomized for my 380 but i'm not there yet.
submitted by Bleakwise to slushpool [link] [comments]

How to mine Bipcoin BIP on pool - YouTube Bitcoin ฉบับง่าย [ Easy Version ] Part 1/5 NiceHash Review 2020  Buy and Sell Mining Hashpower  Hack  51% Attacks BetterHash - A True Profit Switching Miner Now? RandomX Monero Profitability - Mine Monero Step By Step

Bitcoin Nonce is a 4-byte (32-bit) field in the input (block’s header, to be explained later…) of the SHA-256 function that is used to produce Bitcoin Hashes.The nonce needs to be set in such a way that its hashed output should have a certain number of leading zeros and to achieve these miners keep playing with this 4-byte field. The padding is internal to the SHA256 function. A bitcoin developer should not need to concern themselves with it unless they are writing an optimized SHA256. – Mark H Mar 20 at 12:00. 1. You seem to have confused history here a bit. extraNonce was part of even the first Bitcoin release. Bitcoin is a distributed, worldwide, decentralized digital money. Bitcoins are issued and managed without any central authority whatsoever: there is no government, company, or bank in charge of Bitcoin. You might be interested in Bitcoin if you like cryptography, distributed peer-to-peer systems, or economics. Bitcoin stores the nonce in the extraNonce field which is part of the coinbase transaction. Also stores in the extraNounce field is the left most leaf node in the merkle tree (the coinbase is the special first transaction in the block). The basics of the hashcash algorithm are described in more detail here. When mining bitcoin, Researchers estimate that Bitcoin’s creator possibly mined coins up to block 54,316, capturing 1,125,150 BTC or $10.5 billion using today’s exchange rates. For years now armchair sleuths and researchers have tried […] The post New Satoshi Stash Estimate Claims Creator Mined $10.5B Worth of Bitcoin appeared first on Bitcoin News.

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How to mine Bipcoin BIP on pool - YouTube

Bitcoin มันคืออะไรทำไมคนจึงให้มูลค่าแก่มัน แล้วมันทำงานยังไงเราเชื่อถือ ... In this vid I walk you through the how to of it and where to get the latest and greatest version of this Bitcoin miner. Also, this is the enter to win video for my now infamous Bitcoin Fridays. NiceHash is the biggest, most popular, and most controversial cryptocurrency hashpower marketplace in the world, let's review NiceHash in 2020! Subscribe to ... Zcash ZEC equihash mining update, what are the best and most profitable miners for these coins in 2020 along with the Innosilicon A9 official review! Subscri... So how profitable is it to mine Monero after RandomX hardfork? Let's find out and I'll also show you how to mine XMR step by step. Subscribe for more awesome videos and a chance at Free Bitcoin ...

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