Bitcoin Core version 0.19.0.1 released

Let's be 100% clear on the fact that miners never voted on rule changes. ISM and BIP9 gave them the ability to activate, it got abused. [SegWit] could have just been released w/flag dates, like BIP16 or BIP30, but out of courtesy thought would be better to let miners signal /r/Bitcoin

Let's be 100% clear on the fact that miners never voted on rule changes. ISM and BIP9 gave them the ability to activate, it got abused. [SegWit] could have just been released w/flag dates, like BIP16 or BIP30, but out of courtesy thought would be better to let miners signal /Bitcoin submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

BIP30 and BIP34 interaction (was Re: [BIP Proposal] Buried Deployments) | Jorge Timn | Nov 17 2016 /r/bitcoin_devlist

BIP30 and BIP34 interaction (was Re: [BIP Proposal] Buried Deployments) | Jorge Timn | Nov 17 2016 /bitcoin_devlist submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

21 million bitcoins - almost

Found this post by Pieter Wuille on Stack exchange (link provided in comments):
People say the total will be 21000000 BTC. ... however:
The 1st 210000 blocks each allow creating 50 BTC.
The 2nd 210000 blocks each allow creating 25 BTC.
The 3rd 210000 blocks each allow creating 12.5 BTC.
...
The 10th 210000 blocks each allow creating 0.09765625 BTC.
The 11th 210000 blocks each allow creating 0.04882812 BTC, and not 0.048828125 BTC, because only 8 decimals of precision are supported.
...
The 33rd 210000 blocks each allow creating 0.00000001 BTC.
After that, the reward is 0. If you sum all these numbers together, you get 20999999.9769 BTC. ... however, either due to an oversight or intentionally, the coins created in the genesis block cannot be spent. This leaves us with 20999949.9769 BTC. ... however, due to an early problem in Bitcoin, fixed by BIP30, it was possible to create a coinbase transaction identical to a previous coinbase. This caused the coins created by that older coinbase to be irreversibly "overwritten". This happened in block 91842 (overwriting the coinbase of block 91812) and 91880 (overwriting the coinbase of block 91722). Each time, 50 BTC was lost. This leaves us with 20999849.9769 BTC. ... however, the protocol rules allow creating up to the amounts listed above. Due to various bugs and miners experimenting with code, some blocks claim less than allowed. Those coins can never be recovered.
Block 124724 tried to intentionally claim 0.00000001 BTC less than allowed, but accidentally also failed to claim the fees, losing 0.01000001 BTC.
Between block 162705 and block 169899, 193 blocks claimed less than allowed due to a bug, resulting in a total loss of 9.66184623 BTC.
Between block 180324 and block 249185, another 836 blocks claimed less than allowed, resulting in a total loss of 0.52584193 BTC.
Block 501726 had no transaction outputs (except a 0-value commitment), losing the entire 12.5 BTC subsidy.
Block 526591 didn't claim half of the block reward, losing 6.25 BTC.
This leaves us with 20999821.02921183BTC. ... however, since recently there is a concept of provably unspendable coins. Coins can be sent to an "address" which provably burns them (using OP_RETURN). Bitcoin Core tracks these and removes them from its database, so they are easily accounted for. At least 3.71612692 BTC were burned this way. This leaves us with 20999817.31308491BTC (taking everything up to block 528333 into account) ... However, various wallets have been lost or stolen, transactions have been sent to the wrong address, people forgot they owned bitcoin. The totals of this may well be millions. People have tried to tally known losses up here. This leaves us with: ??? BTC.
submitted by ZepCoin to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Bitcoin dev IRC meeting in layman's terms (2015-11-05)

Once again my attempt to summarize and explain the weekly bitcoin developer meeting in layman's terms. Link to last weeks summarization Note that I crosspost this to Voat, bitcoin.com and the bitcoin-discuss mailing list every week. I can't control what's being talking about in the meeting, if certain things come up I might not be able to post here because of "guidelines".
Disclaimer
Please bear in mind I'm not a developer and I'd have problems coding "hello world!", so some things might be incorrect or plain wrong. Like any other write-up it likely contains personal biases, although I try to stay as neutral as I can. There are no decisions being made in these meetings, so if I say "everyone agrees" this means everyone present in the meeting, that's not consensus, but since a fair amount of devs are present it's a good representation. The dev IRC and mailinglist are for bitcoin development purposes. If you have not contributed actual code to a bitcoin-implementation, this is probably not the place you want to reach out to. There are many places to discuss things that the developers read, including this sub-reddit.
link to this week logs Meeting minutes by meetbot
Main topics discussed where:
Sigcache performance Performance goals for 0.12 transaction priority sigops flooding attack chain limits
Short topics/notes
Note: cfields, mcelrath and BlueMatt (and maybe more) missed the meeting because of daylight saving time.
Closing date for proposals for the scaling bitcoin workshop is the 9th.
Check to see if there are any other commits for the 0.11.2 RC. As soon as 6948 and 6825 are merged it seems good to go. We need to move fairly quick as there are already miners voting for CLTV (F2Pool). Also testnet is CLTV locked already and is constantly forking. 0.11.2 RC1 has been released as of today: https://bitcoin.org/bin/bitcoin-core-0.11.2/test/
Most of the mempool-limiting analysis assumed child-pays-for-parent, however that isn't ready for 0.12 yet, so we should think about possible abuses in context of the existing mining algorithm.
Because of time-constrains opt-in replace-by-fee has been deferred to next weeks meeting, but most people seem to want it in 0.12. sdaftuar makes a note that we need to make clear to users what they need to do if they don't want to accept opt-in transactions.
Sigcache performance
The signature cache, which is in place to increase performance (by not having to check the signature multiple times), and to mitigate some attacks currently has a default limit of 50 000 signatures. Sipa has a pull-request which proposes to: Change the limit from number of entries to megabytes Change the default to 40MB, which corresponds to 500 000 signatures Store salted hashes instead of full entries Remove entries that have been validated in a block
Sipa did benchmarks for various signature cache sizes on hitrate in blocks (how many of the cached signatures are in the block). The maximum sigcache size was 68MB, resulting in a 3% miss-rate. Some blocks though have extremely high miss rates (60%) while others have none. Likely caused by miners running different policies. Gmaxwell proposed to always run script verification for mempool transactions, even if these transactions get rejected into the mempool by the clients policy. The result of that is that even a 300MB sigcache size only gets down to 15% misses. So there's too much crap being relayed to keep any reasonable sized cache. Gmaxwell points out downsides to not checking any rejected transactions, namely: there are some DOS attacks possible, and you increase your misrate if you set a policy which is more restrictive than the typical network, which might result in a race to the bottom.
Sipa continues his work and seeks out other strategies
Performance goals for 0.12
Bitcoin-core 0.12 is scheduled for release December 1st.
Everybody likes to include secp256k1 ASAP, as it has a very large performance increase. Some people would like to include the sigcache pull-request, BIP30, modifyNewCoins and a createNewBlock rewrite if it's ready. Wumpus advises against merging last-minute performance improvements for 0.12.
Mentioned pull-requests should be reviewed, prioritizing CreateNewBlock
transaction priority
Each transaction is assigned a priority, determined by the age, size, and number of inputs. Which makes some transactions free.
Sipa thinks we should get rid of the current priority completely and replace it with a function that modifies fee or size of a transaction. There's a pull-request available that optimizes the current transaction priority, thereby avoiding the political debate that goes with changing the definition of transaction priority. Luke-jr thinks the old policy should remain possible.
Check to see if PR #6357 is safe and efficient enough.
sigops flooding attack
The number of ECDSA signature-checking operations or sigops is currently limited to 20 000 per block. This in order to prevent miners creating blocks that take ages to verify as those operations are time-consuming. You could however construct transactions that have a very high sigops count and since most miners don't take into account the sigops count they end up with very small blocks because the sigop limit is reached. This attack is described here.
Suggestion to take the number of sigops relative to the maximum blocksize into account with the total size. Meaning a 10k sigops transaction would currently be viewed as 500kB in size (for that single transaction, not towards the block). That suggestion would be easy to change in the mining code, but more invasive to try and plug that into everything that looks at feerate. This would also open up attacks on the mempool if these transactions are not evicted by mempool limiting. Luke-jr has a bytes-per-sigop limit, that filters out these attack transactions.
More analysis should be done, people seem fine with the general direction of fixing it.
chain limits
Chain in this context means connected transactions. When you send a transaction that depends on another transaction that has yet to be confirmed we talk about a chain of transactions. Miners ideally take the whole chain into account instead of just every single transaction (although that's not widely implemented afaik). So while a single transaction might not have a sufficient fee, a depending transaction could have a high enough fee to make it worthwhile to mine both. This is commonly known as child-pays-for-parent. Since you can make these chains very big it's possible to clog up the mempool this way. With the recent malleability attacks, anyone who made transactions going multiple layers deep would've already encountered huge problems doing this (beautifully explained in let's talk bitcoin #258 from 13:50 onwards) Proposal and github link.
sdaftuar's analysis shows that 40% of blocks contain a chain that exceeds the proposed limits. Even a small bump doesn't make the problem go away. Possible sources of these chains: a service paying the fees on other transactions (child-pays-for-parent), an iOS wallet that gladly spends unconfirmed change. A business confirms they use child-pays-for-parent when they receive bitcoins from an unspent chain. It is possible that these long chains are delivered to miners directly, in which case they wouldn't be affected by the proposed relay limits (and by malleability). Since this is a problem that needs to be addressed, people seem fine with merging it anyway, communicating in advance to let businesses think about how this affects them.
Merge "Policy: Lower default limits for tx chains" Morcos will mail the developer mailing list after it's merged.
Participants
morcos Alex Morcos gmaxwell Gregory Maxwell wumpus Wladimir J. van der Laan sipa Pieter Wuille jgarzik Jeff Garzik Luke-Jr Luke Dashjr phantomcircuit Patrick Strateman sdaftuar Suhas Daftuar btcdrak btcdrak jouke ??Jouke Hofman?? jtimon Jorge Timón jonasschnelli Jonas Schnelli 
Comic relief
20:01 wumpus #meetingend 20:01 wumpus #meetingstop 20:01 gmaxwell Thanks all. 20:01 btcdrak #exitmeeting 20:01 gmaxwell #nomeetingnonono 20:01 btcdrak #meedingexit 20:01 wumpus #endmeeting 20:01 lightningbot Meeting ended Thu Nov 5 20:01:29 2015 UTC. Information about MeetBot at http://wiki.debian.org/MeetBot . 20:01 btcdrak #rekt 
submitted by G1lius to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

BIP30 and BIP34 interaction (was Re: [BIP Proposal] Buried Deployments) | Jorge Timón | Nov 17 2016

Jorge Timón on Nov 17 2016:
On Thu, Nov 17, 2016 at 1:00 AM, Eric Voskuil wrote:
This is a misinterpretation of BIP30. Duplicate transaction hashes can
and will happen and are perfectly valid in Bitcoin. BIP34 does not
prevent this.
Sorry for moving the topic, but isn't duplication of tx hashes
precisely what BIP30 prevents?
That was my undesrtanding but should read it again.
Since regular txs take inputs, the collision is extremely unlikely
(again, this is my understanding, please correct me when wrong), the
worrying case is coinbase txs (which don't have input to take entropy
from). By introducing the committed height, collisions on coinbase txs
are prevented too.
If I'm wrong on any of this I'm more than happy to learn why.
original: https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2016-Novembe013290.html
submitted by dev_list_bot to bitcoin_devlist [link] [comments]

Bitcoin dev IRC meeting in layman's terms (2015-11-05)

Once again my attempt to summarize and explain the weekly bitcoin developer meeting in layman's terms. Link to last weeks summarization
On a personal note: I really don't like the fact someone pm'ed me telling me "a majority of bitcoiners have moved to btc", it's not (yet) true and comes across as very spammy. This combined with the tin-foiled hat people-bashing which seems to be popular makes me almost not want to join this community. I hope this can become like bitcoin, but with the freedom to discuss and mention any topic, not a mindless crusade against bitcoin, theymos, blockstream, etc.
Disclaimer
Please bear in mind I'm not a developer and I'd have problems coding "hello world!", so some things might be incorrect or plain wrong. Like any other write-up it likely contains personal biases, although I try to stay as neutral as I can. There are no decisions being made in these meetings, so if I say "everyone agrees" this means everyone present in the meeting, that's not consensus, but since a fair amount of devs are present it's a good representation. The dev IRC and mailinglist are for bitcoin development purposes. If you have not contributed actual code to a bitcoin-implementation, this is probably not the place you want to reach out to. There are many places to discuss things that the developers read, including this sub-reddit.
link to this week logs Meeting minutes by meetbot
Main topics discussed where:
Sigcache performance Performance goals for 0.12 transaction priority sigops flooding attack chain limits
Short topics/notes
Note: cfields, mcelrath and BlueMatt (and maybe more) missed the meeting because of daylight saving time.
Closing date for proposals for the scaling bitcoin workshop is the 9th.
Check to see if there are any other commits for the 0.11.2 RC. As soon as 6948 and 6825 are merged it seems good to go. We need to move fairly quick as there are already miners voting for CLTV (F2Pool). Also testnet is CLTV locked already and is constantly forking. 0.11.2 RC1 has been released as of today: https://bitcoin.org/bin/bitcoin-core-0.11.2/test/
Most of the mempool-limiting analysis assumed child-pays-for-parent, however that isn't ready for 0.12 yet, so we should think about possible abuses in context of the existing mining algorithm.
Because of time-constrains opt-in replace-by-fee has been deferred to next weeks meeting, but most people seem to want it in 0.12. sdaftuar makes a note that we need to make clear to users what they need to do if they don't want to accept opt-in transactions.
Sigcache performance
The signature cache, which is in place to increase performance (by not having to check the signature multiple times), and to mitigate some attacks currently has a default limit of 50 000 signatures. Sipa has a pull-request which proposes to: Change the limit from number of entries to megabytes Change the default to 40MB, which corresponds to 500 000 signatures Store salted hashes instead of full entries Remove entries that have been validated in a block
Sipa did benchmarks for various signature cache sizes on hitrate in blocks (how many of the cached signatures are in the block). The maximum sigcache size was 68MB, resulting in a 3% miss-rate. Some blocks though have extremely high miss rates (60%) while others have none. Likely caused by miners running different policies. Gmaxwell proposed to always run script verification for mempool transactions, even if these transactions get rejected into the mempool by the clients policy. The result of that is that even a 300MB sigcache size only gets down to 15% misses. So there's too much crap being relayed to keep any reasonable sized cache. Gmaxwell points out downsides to not checking any rejected transactions, namely: there are some DOS attacks possible, and you increase your misrate if you set a policy which is more restrictive than the typical network, which might result in a race to the bottom.
Sipa continues his work and seeks out other strategies
Performance goals for 0.12
Bitcoin-core 0.12 is scheduled for release December 1st.
Everybody likes to include secp256k1 ASAP, as it has a very large performance increase. Some people would like to include the sigcache pull-request, BIP30, modifyNewCoins and a createNewBlock rewrite if it's ready. Wumpus advises against merging last-minute performance improvements for 0.12.
Mentioned pull-requests should be reviewed, prioritizing CreateNewBlock
transaction priority
Each transaction is assigned a priority, determined by the age, size, and number of inputs. Which makes some transactions free.
Sipa thinks we should get rid of the current priority completely and replace it with a function that modifies fee or size of a transaction. There's a pull-request available that optimizes the current transaction priority, thereby avoiding the political debate that goes with changing the definition of transaction priority. Luke-jr thinks the old policy should remain possible.
Check to see if PR #6357 is safe and efficient enough.
sigops flooding attack
The number of ECDSA signature-checking operations or sigops is currently limited to 20 000 per block. This in order to prevent miners creating blocks that take ages to verify as those operations are time-consuming. You could however construct transactions that have a very high sigops count and since most miners don't take into account the sigops count they end up with very small blocks because the sigop limit is reached. This attack is described here.
Suggestion to take the number of sigops relative to the maximum blocksize into account with the total size. Meaning a 10k sigops transaction would currently be viewed as 500kB in size (for that single transaction, not towards the block). That suggestion would be easy to change in the mining code, but more invasive to try and plug that into everything that looks at feerate. This would also open up attacks on the mempool if these transactions are not evicted by mempool limiting. Luke-jr has a bytes-per-sigop limit, that filters out these attack transactions.
More analysis should be done, people seem fine with the general direction of fixing it.
chain limits
Chain in this context means connected transactions. When you send a transaction that depends on another transaction that has yet to be confirmed we talk about a chain of transactions. Miners ideally take the whole chain into account instead of just every single transaction (although that's not widely implemented afaik). So while a single transaction might not have a sufficient fee, a depending transaction could have a high enough fee to make it worthwhile to mine both. This is commonly known as child-pays-for-parent. Since you can make these chains very big it's possible to clog up the mempool this way. With the recent malleability attacks, anyone who made transactions going multiple layers deep would've already encountered huge problems doing this (beautifully explained in let's talk bitcoin #258 from 13:50 onwards) Proposal and github link.
sdaftuar's analysis shows that 40% of blocks contain a chain that exceeds the proposed limits. Even a small bump doesn't make the problem go away. Possible sources of these chains: a service paying the fees on other transactions (child-pays-for-parent), an iOS wallet that gladly spends unconfirmed change. A business confirms they use child-pays-for-parent when they receive bitcoins from an unspent chain. It is possible that these long chains are delivered to miners directly, in which case they wouldn't be affected by the proposed relay limits (and by malleability). Since this is a problem that needs to be addressed, people seem fine with merging it anyway, communicating in advance to let businesses think about how this affects them.
Merge "Policy: Lower default limits for tx chains" Morcos will mail the developer mailing list after it's merged.
Participants
morcos Alex Morcos gmaxwell Gregory Maxwell wumpus Wladimir J. van der Laan sipa Pieter Wuille jgarzik Jeff Garzik Luke-Jr Luke Dashjr phantomcircuit Patrick Strateman sdaftuar Suhas Daftuar btcdrak btcdrak jouke ??Jouke Hofman?? jtimon Jorge Timón jonasschnelli Jonas Schnelli 
Comic relief
20:01 wumpus #meetingend 20:01 wumpus #meetingstop 20:01 gmaxwell Thanks all. 20:01 btcdrak #exitmeeting 20:01 gmaxwell #nomeetingnonono 20:01 btcdrak #meedingexit 20:01 wumpus #endmeeting 20:01 lightningbot Meeting ended Thu Nov 5 20:01:29 2015 UTC. Information about MeetBot at http://wiki.debian.org/MeetBot . 20:01 btcdrak #rekt 
submitted by G1lius to btc [link] [comments]

Can someone find your address by looking at a BIP30 encrypted private key?

If I have a paper wallet and store my BIP30 encrypted private key on the paper, and someone finds the paper, could they then find the bitcoin address without the BIP30 password?
submitted by dietstache to BitcoinBeginners [link] [comments]

Bitcoin - YouTube Die 30 Länder mit dem größten Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) der Welt - 1960-2019 Top 30 ECONOMIES (GDP) how to send and receive bitcoins on blockchain BIP39 Bitcoin Private Key and Aeternity Key Translate Help Bitcoin - YouTube

Bitcoin Stack Exchange is a question and answer site for Bitcoin crypto-currency enthusiasts. It only takes a minute to sign up. The third solution presented is implemented by BIP30 - this was a stopgap solution to prevent the worst from happening. A more complete solution (the first one) being deployed as BIP 34 Mnemonic code for generating deterministic keys. You can enter an existing BIP39 mnemonic, or generate a new random one. Typing your own twelve words will probably not work how you expect, since the words require a particular structure (the last word contains a checksum). A Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP) is a standard for proposing changes to the Bitcoin protocol, or in some cases a source for information for the Bitcoin community. Additionally, some BIPs are proposed changes to the BIP process itself. During Bitcoin’s first two years, Satoshi Nakamoto performed several soft forks by just releasing the backwards-compatible change in a client that began immediately enforcing the new rule. Multiple soft forks such as BIP30 have been activated via a flag day where the new rule began to be enforced at a preset time or block height. The Bitcoin reference client uses randomly generated keys. In order to avoid the necessity for a backup after every transaction, (by default) 100 keys are cached in a pool of reserve keys. Still, these wallets are not intended to be shared and used on several systems simultaneously.

[index] [1431] [25996] [7921] [12724] [30695] [19860] [7276] [18384] [22631] [28091]

Bitcoin - YouTube

USCyberlabs has created the first true commercial grade Bitcoin HD-BIP32 Business wallet system. Today older Bitcoin wallets are not shareable so they become a problem with companies that need ... How to sell bitcoin and withdraw funds into your bank account - LUNO account - Duration: 6:31. Vincent Mbatha 15,267 views. 6:31. Bitcoin 101 - Getting Your BTCs out of Your Paper Wallets & Cold Storage - Fun with Sloppy Wallets by CRI. 10:54. Acquistare BITCOIN in EURO (2019) - I Migliori Exchange a BASSE COMMISSIONI by ... bitcoin private key generator, btc bruteforce, bitcrack targeting 42000 address with 3 millionbtc - Duration: 4:00. ICON BTCX 8,694 views Aprende sobre Bitcoin,Blockchain,Alcoins,tokens etc. Sobre mi: Hola mi nombres es Alexis como lo pudiste haber notado, inicie en las inversiones de las cript...

Flag Counter